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This article surveys the decisions made by the Florida Su-
preme Court between October 1, 1989 and September 30, 1990
which deal with real property. The six decisions concern condo-
miniums, real estate sales, recording and wills. It is interesting
that there are so few supreme court decisions in this area despite
the fact that real estate is such an important and large part of
the practice of law in this state.
I. CONDOMINIUMS - RECREATION LEASES
Association of Golden Glades Condominium Club, Inc. v. Secur-
ity Management Corp.'
In 1970, the developer of the Golden Glades Condominium filed a
* Professor of Law, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
The author would like to thank his research assistant Keith Baron, class of '92, for
his assistance, and would also like to thank Professors Joseph Grohman, Michael
Masinter, and Donna Seiden for reading and commenting on parts of this paper.
1. 557 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1990). Justice Overton wrote the opinion in which Chief
Justice Ehrlich and Justices Grimes and Kogan concurred. Justices Shaw and Barkett
concurred in the result only. Justice McDonald concurred with an opinion.
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declaration of condominium. The condominium association2 immedi-
ately leased recreational property from the Golden Glades Club Recre-
ation Corporation; the lease included a rent escalation clause. Later,3
the lessor merged with the developer and with the Security Manage-
ment Corporation. As a result of the merger, Security Management
became the successor landlord. Security Management brought this suit
to collect what it claimed was due for the period between 1980 and
January 1987 under the rent escalation clause.
The question originally posed to the court was whether section
718.401(8) of the Florida Statutes prohibited rent escalation under a
lease entered into before June 4, 1975, when the statute became effec-
tive. 4 After the district court entered its decision in this case, the legis-
lature amended the statute, creating section 718.4015. 5 The 1989
amendment6 was intended to clarify the 1988 amendment.' The su-
preme court decided it would be appropriate to decide this case under
the amended statute, rephrasing the certified question as: "TO WHAT
EXTENT DOES SECTION 718.4015(2), FLORIDA STATUTES,
PROHIBIT ENFORCEMENT OF ESCALATION CLAUSES IN
LEASES ENTERED INTO PRIOR TO JUNE 4, 1975? " '8
The supreme court expressly rejected any claim that the 1988
amendment allowed the enforcement of escalation clauses contained in
leases, like the lease in this case, entered into prior to June 4, 1975.1
The statute did not change how escalation clauses entered into prior to
2. The association, the Golden Glades Condominium Club, Inc., was apparently
controlled at that moment by the developer.
3. The merger occurred in 1981.
4. 557 So. 2d at 1351.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 718.401(8)(a)(b) (1975), amended by FLA. STAT. §
718.4015 (1989).
6. See FLA. STAT. § 718.4015(2) (1989) (amending FLA. STAT. § 718.4015
(1988)).
7. As amended, the statute provides:
(2) [I]t prohibits the enforcement of escalation clauses in leases related to
condominiums for which the declaration of condominium was recorded
prior to June 4, 1975, but which have been refused enforcement on
grounds that the parties agreed to be bound by subsequent amendments to
the Florida Statutes or have been found to be void. . . or which bave been
refused enforcement . . ..
FLA. STAT. § 718.4015(2) (1989).
8. 557 So. 2d at 1351.
9. Id.
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June 4, 1975 were to be enforced, 10 but merely intended to "recognize
established case law and establish a statutory prohibition for escalated
rents pursuant to those escalation clauses due after October 1, 1988.
This interpretation is also consistent with the 1989 amendment
"11
Under the existing case law,12 passage of section 718.401(8) in
1975 invalidated any rent escalation clause in an existing lease if a
lessor and an association had intended to be bound by subsequent
amendments to the condominium act. Consequently, the question in
this case was whether this lessor had agreed to be bound by subsequent
amendments to the Florida Statutes, but in this case, the lessor trying
to enforce the rent escalation clause was not the original lessor. Nor
was the current lessor one of the parties to the condominium docu-
ments in which there was an agreement binding the parties to subse-
quent amendments to the Florida Statutes.
Even though Security Management had become the lessor and
also the successor to the developer, they were separate entities when the
declaration and the lease were entered into, and it was "never alleged
at trial that the lessor and developer should be viewed as one corpora-
tion and that the corporate veil should be pierced."' 8 Consequently, the
existing case law was not applicable because it applied only to parties
who had agreed to be bound by subsequent statutory amendments, and
these had not.
The outcome of this case might have been different if such a claim
had been successfully made at trial, and that leaves the reader to spec-
ulate on the precedential value of this case. The court might have been
hinting at a willingness to pierce the corporate veil under these circum-
stances. Unfortunately, the court did not reveal why the successor, by a
series of mergers, should not be bound by the agreements and the law,
which would have bound one of the merged parties. Hopefully, the
court did not intend to indicate that a business entity can escape its
contractual obligations by merging into another entity.
The court also concluded that there was nothing to suggest that
10. The treatment of escalation clauses remained unchanged at least for claims
arising prior to October 1,. 1988.
11. Id. at 1355.
12. See Angora Enter., Inc. v. Cole, 439 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 927 (1984).
13. Golden Glades, 557 So. 2d at 1355 n.2.
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the merger by itself was intended to change the terms of the lease. 4
Therefore, the merger did not have the effect of adding to the lease the
provision that the lease would subsequently incorporate amendments to
the Florida Statutes, and that the subsequent merger of these parties,
by itself, could not cause that change in the lease. This author cannot
imagine any logical reason why it would have.
The petitioner had also claimed that the adoption of the definitions
from the condominium declaration into the lease had the effect of also
adopting into the lease the part of the condominium document whereby
the parties would agree to be bound by subsequent amendments of the
Florida Statutes. The court apparently found this argument did not
merit analysis and simply ignored it.15
Justice McDonald concurred. He pointed out that article 1, section
10 of the Florida Constitution prohibits any law impairing the obliga-
tion of contracts. He stated: "No matter how hard the legislature may
try, it cannot affect the terms of a contract unless the contracting par-
ties indicated an intent to allow it to do so and agreed to follow future
legislative enactments. This did not happen here."' 6
Consequently, if the majority had found that this statute prohib-
ited enforcement of a rent escalation clause entered into before the
statute's enactment, Justice McDonald would have voted to hold the
statute unconstitutional.
II. REAL ESTATE SALES
A. Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
Samara Development Corporation v. Marlow"
The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 8 is a federal stat-
14. Id. at 1355.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1356 (McDonald, J., concurring).
17. 556 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1990). Chief Justice Ehrlich wrote the opinion in
which Justices Shaw, Barkett and Kogan joined. Justice Overton wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Grimes concurred. Justice McDonald dissented without
opinion.
18. Housing & Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat.
476, as amended by Housing & Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-383, 88 Stat. 633; Housing & Community Development Amendments of 1979, Pub.
L 96-153; Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-628 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1700-1720 (1982)). Reference in
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ute which was designed to protect consumers. It prohibits developers
from engaging in certain activities 19 and requires that developers dis-
close certain information by filing registration statements2" and making
property reports available to prospective buyers or lessees.2 When
these requirements are violated, the act provides that "[a] purchaser or
lessee may bring an action at law or in equity . . .[and] the court may
order damages, specific performance, or such other relief as the court
deems fair, just, and equitable."22 When the seller in this case breached
the contract, 3 the buyer sought damages under this statute because the
contract had limited his remedies to rescission of the contract or to
specific performance.
The critical question was whether the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act even applied. The act exempts from coverage any sales
contract which obligated the developer to erect a building within two
years.24 The contract to buy a condominium unit, which this buyer had
signed, required that the unit would be completed at a date less than
two years from the date of the agreement. Consequently, the seller
claimed it fit within the statutory exemption, but the district court had
not agreed,2 5 and, in this decision, the Florida Supreme Court approved
this article will be to the U.S.C. sections. See also Beyond Consumer Protection: The
Application of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act to Condominium Sales,
37 U. FLA. L. REv. 945 (1985); R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §
2.08 (1959).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1982).
20. Id. at 99 1703(a)(1)(A), 1704-1706.
21. Id. at §9 1703(a)(1)(B), 1707.
22. Id. at § 1709(a). Furthermore, the recovery may include "interest, court
costs, and reasonable amounts for attorneys' fees, independent appraisers' fees, and
travel to and from the lot." Id. at § 1709(c).
23. It is not clear how the seller defaulted from either the supreme court's deci-
sion or from the district court's decision in Marlow v. Samara Development Corp., 528
So. 2d 420 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
24. Section 1702 provides:
(a) Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose of evasion
of this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall not apply to-
(2) the sale or lease of any improved land on which there is a residential,
commercial, condominium, or industrial building,or the sale or lease under
a contract obligating the seller or lessor to erect such a building thereon
within a period of two years.
15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(2) (1982).
25. Marlow, 528 So. 2d 540.
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of that conclusion.26
The basis of the holding was that because the buyer could not re-
cover damages if the seller defaulted, this contract essentially gave the
seller the choice of returning the buyer's money rather than completing
the project." Thus, the contract did not really obligate the seller to
erect a building within two years, and so it did not fall within the statu-
tory exception.
The seller had argued that the HUD guidelines 2s provided other-
wise and that the courts should defer to the judgment of the agency
empowered to interpret and enforce the act. While the district court
had recognized that principle, it had simply followed its own prece-
dent2" in rejecting the exemption claim, but it felt constrained to certify
the question,3 0 implicitly acknowledging the conflict between its holding
and the HUD guidelines.
That was the point of Justice Overton's dissent."' He stated: "If I
26. Marlow, 556 So. 2d at 1099.
27. Id. at 1098.
28. Guidelines for Exemptions under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 24,010, 24,012 (1979) [referred to as the "1979 HUD Guidelines"],
and Guidelines for Exemptions under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 49
Fed. Reg. 31375, 31376 [referred to as the "1984 HUD Guidelines"].
29. See Berzon v. Oriole Homes Corp., 497 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986).
30. The question certified was as follows:
IS A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF A CONDOMINIUM IN
FLORIDA EXEMPT FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTER-
STATE LAND SALES FULL DISCLOSURE ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1710,
WHERE IT PROVIDES FOR COMPLETION WITHIN TWO YEARS
BUT RESTRICTS THE BUYER'S REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF
THE CONTRACT BY THE SELLERS TO A RETURN OF THE DE-
POSIT OR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, OR MUST THE CON-
TRACT ALSO AFFORD THE BUYER THE ALTERNATE REMEDY
OF A SUIT FOR DAMAGES?
Marlow, 528 So. 2d at 422; Marlow, 556 So. 2d at 1098. The reference to section 1710
is rather odd. That section deals the relief available to a person aggrieved by an order
or determination of the Secretary of HUD. In all probability, this is merely a typo-
graphical error in the district court's opinion which was inadvertently repeated by the
supreme court. It should have been 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982).
31. After establishing the authority of HUD under 15 U.S.C. § 1715 (1982), he
examined the 1979 HUD Guidelines, the 1984 HUD Guidelines, and pointed out "nu-
merous [Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration] advisory opinions which state
that exemptions will be granted to complete the building within two years and the
purchaser is not restricted from seeking specific performance." Marlow, 556 So. 2d at
1102 (Overton, J., dissenting).
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were writing on a clean slate, I would have no problems reaching the
conclusion of the majority." 32 But, he concluded, "I find that we must
defer to the authorized federal agency's interpretation of the federal
statute unless it is shown to be clearly erroneous."33 The majority, how-
ever, found no conflict.
In examining the 1979 and 1984 HUD Guidelines, it found that
the examples were to be merely illustrative, not exhaustive. The exam-
ple of a non-exempt sale provided in the 1979 Guidelines was a con-
tract which limited the buyer's right to seek specific performance. The
example of a non-exempt sale provided in the 1984 Guidelines was a
contract which provided that the breaching seller would be liable only
for the return of the buyer's deposit. But these were not intended to
establish the only types of non-exempt sales contracts. "The position
indicated by these guidelines is clearly that the obligation to complete
construction within two years must not be illusory."3 4
Furthermore, the court invoked two well established canons of
statutory interpretation. First, a statute intended to protect the public
should be liberally construed in favor of the public. Second, exceptions
should be narrowly and strictly construed. It used these, apparently, as
the basis for adopting a liberal definition of "illusory."3 5
Whether a contract is illusory is a matter of state contract law on
which the Florida Supreme Court is the highest authority. The court
concluded that under Florida law, "without the availability of at least
both specific performance and damages the obligation to complete con-
struction within two years is illusory. '3 6 Therefore, this contract did
not fit within the statutory exemption, and the buyer was entitled to the
statutory remedy.
The majority, however, pointed out that the dissent relied on advisory opinions
issued during a six month period during 1982 and that there were earlier and later
advisory opinions which were contradictory. More importantly, the advisory opinions
may have been based upon counsel's representation of state law. Id. at 1100 n.2.
32. Marlow, 556 So. 2d at 1102.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1099-1100.
35. Id. at 1101. The author suggests that the conclusion of the court that this
obligation is illusory is only for the purposes of deciding whether this sale is exempt
from the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act and is not to suggest that such a
contract is illusory for any or all other purposes.
36. Id. at 1101.
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B. Closing Practices
Warren Finance, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville37
This case does not deal directly with real property. It deals with
cashier's checks. However, it is included in this survey because it re-
flects upon a common practice at real estate closings. 8 Real estate
purchase contracts frequently provide that the buyer will pay the
purchase price, above new or existing mortgages, by cashier's check.
The buyer has the cashier's check made out to himself or herself, and
then at the closing, endorses the cashier's check over to the seller. Buy-
ers follow this practice so that if the closing is aborted, it will be easy
for them to deposit the check into their own accounts. This practice
raises several questions for the seller and his or her attorney. Does the
contract require the seller to accept that endorsed cashier's check? Is
the seller taking any additional risks by accepting that check?
In Warren Finance, the supreme court was presented with the fol-
lowing certified question: "MAY THE ISSUING BANK ASSERT
THE DEFENSES OF A PAYEE OR ENDORSEE AGAINST THE
RIGHT OF A SUBSEQUENT ENDORSEE TO RECEIVE PAY-
MENT ON A CASHIER'S CHECK? '3 9 If the issuing bank could re-
fuse to pay the check and escape liability by asserting the defenses of
the payee or endorsee,40 then the seller taking the endorsed cashier's
check would have an instrument which might not be paid for a greater
number of reasons than if the seller had received a cashier's check
made out to him or her directly. By accepting the endorsed check, the
seller might be taking additional risks thereby losing some of the pro-
tection sought by having the contract provide for payment by cashier's
check. Of course, whether the seller would be required to accept that
check would depend on the terms of the particular contract, so in-
formed parties should consider this case carefully before drafting a
contract and negotiating its terms.
37. 552 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1990). Justice McDonald wrote the cpinion in which
Justices Overton, Barkett, Grimes and Kogan and Chief Justice Ehrlich joined. Justice
Shaw wrote a special concurrence.
38. The common practice referred to is namely, the closing of the sales transac-
tion when the buyer pays the price and the seller delivers the deed.
39. Id.
40. See infra text and accompanying notes 50-60. Defenses of the payee and
endorsee include fraud in the underlying transaction between the payee or endorser and
the endorsee who is presenting the cashier's check for payment.
1234 [Vol. 15
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In this case, Barnett Bank issued three cashier's checks naming
Redan as payee and Blossam and Butler as purchasers. The payee en-
dorsed the cashier's checks to Warren who deposited them in its ac-
count at another bank. Having a change of heart,41 the payee and one
of the purchasers convinced Barnett Bank to refuse payment based
upon allegations that the endorsee had committed fraud. The endorsee
brought this suit against the bank for the wrongful dishonor of the
checks. The district court remanded the case to determine if Warren
was a holder in due course,42 but this court quashed that decision, or-
dering the reinstatement of the trial court's judgment that the bank
pay daniages to the endorsee. 43
Two theories are currently in vogue regarding cashier's checks.
One is the cash equivalent theory, which analogizes the cashier's check
to a certified check. Under U.C.C. section 4-303, 4 because a certified
check has already been accepted by the certifying bank, it may not be
dishonored "based either on its own defenses or the defenses of another
party to the check" 45 and so neither may the cashier's check. The court
rejected this analysis.
The other approach is the note theory. Characterizing a cashier's
check as a draft drawn by the bank upon itself, this theory relies upon
U.C.C. section 3-118, which provides that such a draft is "effective as a
note. ' " Under the U.C.C., the defenses available against one present-,
ing a note would depend on whether the person was a holder in due
course.47 The court rejected this analysis too.
Rather than adopt either of these theories, 8 the court pointed out
41. The payee sought to stop payment because Warren had allegedly breached
other terms of their agreement by refusing to advance funds to Redan. Warren Fi-
nance, 552 So. 2d at 195.
42. Barnett Bank v. Warren Finance., Inc., 532 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
43. Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 201.
44. U.C.C. § 4-303 (1987). The court prefers to refer to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code sections rather than to the statutory counterpart, chapters 671-680 of the
Florida Statutes. See Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 196 n.2. This discussion will fol-
low the same format.
45. Id. at 197.
46. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 3-118 (1987)).
47. See U.C.C. § 3-305 (1987).
48. It may also be possible to analogize a cashier's check to a letter of credit,
which under U.C.C. § 5-114(2), a customer may enjoin the issuing bank from honoring
due to fraud in the transaction if the presenter is not a holder in due course. However,
further analysis of these three theories is beyond the scope of this article, which is to
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that the U.C.C. lacks any provisions which govern the problem49 and
that: "When used in place of a personal check or other negotiable in-
strument, the parties' expectation is that the cashier's check will re-
move all doubt as to whether the instrument will be returned to the
holder unpaid due to insufficient funds in the account, a stop payment
order or insolvency."5 Therefore, the court invoked U.C.C. section 1-
10351 and U.C.C. section 1-102(1)52 as the basis for giving prime im-
portance to the commercial use of cashier's checks and expectations of
people using cashier's checks.
It concluded that the issuing bank must not be placed in the mid-
dle of disputes about underlying transactions and that payees and en-
dorsees must be able to rely upon the cash-like quality of cashier's
checks, 53 but, "[a] rule that would absolutely forbid a bank's refusing
to pay the holder of a cashier's check . . . would be inordinate. ' 54 It
adopted the rule that "upon presentment for payment by a holder, a
bank may only assert its real and personal defenses in order to refuse
payment on a cashier's check issued by the bank, ' 55 and it went on to
state that:
The only inquiry a bank may make upon the presentment of a
cashier's check is whether or not the payee or endorsee is in fact a
legitimate holder, i.e., whether the cashier's check is being
presented by a thief or one who simply found a lost check, or
whether the check has been materially altered.5 1
It seems that the court is, in this dicta, narrowing the scope of "real
focus on the effect of the case upon real property law and practice.
49. Of course, a contrary argument can be made. The U.C.C. clearly provides
the rules which apply to checks and, by not treating a cashier's check any differently,
the drafters and the adopting legislatures have indicated an intent that these rules ap-
ply the same way to cashier's checks as they do to checks drawn by others.
50. Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 196.
51. This section provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of
this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions." U.C.C.
§ 1-103 (1987).
52. This section provides that "[tihis Act shall be liberally construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies," noting that one of these is "to permit
the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement
of the parties." UCC § 1-102(2)(b) (1987).
53. Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 201.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
1236 [Vol. 15
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and personal defenses" available to the issuing bank and thereby elimi-
nating some, such as the failure of consideration in the purchase of the
cashier's check. 7 Whether the court really intended to go so far and
whether subsequent courts will feel bound by this language is
uncertain.
The language quoted above would seem to eliminate any reason
for a seller to hesitate in accepting a properly endorsed cashier's check
at a real estate closing. If only the court had stopped there. Unfortu-
nately, the court created some uncertainty when it chastised the district
court for its mistaken reliance on an Ohio case. 8 In that case, one
person was both the purchaser and payee of a cashier's check. He had
purchased a car, paying for it with a cashier's check that he endorsed
over to the car's seller. Upon discovering the condition of the car had
been misrepresented, the purchaser/payee convinced the issuing bank
to refuse payment. The Ohio court had held that the issuing bank
could, in its discretion, refuse payment at the request of the purchaser/
payee without incurring liability.
The Florida Supreme Court emphasized that the Ohio case was
distinguishable, correctly stressing that the case before the court did
not deal with a purchaser/payee as did the Ohio case.59 What follows
begins - "[m]oreover, banks cannot be permitted .... -60 "More-
over" means "in addition to what has been said."' 61 The problem is that
the opinion did not clarify to what the addition applied. Is it in addition
to what had already been said about the reasons the Ohio case should
not have been followed, i.e., does it mean that, in addition to being
factually distinguishable, the Ohio case is also badly reasoned and
would not have been followed even if not distinguishable? Or was the
court simply reiterating the reasons for its holding without considering
the persuasive value of the Ohio case?
This author would suggest that the former is more likely the cor-
rect interpretation. The reasons that followed the "moreover" were that
banks should not be allowed the discretion to refuse to pay cashier's
57. See U.C.C. § 3-408 (1987), entitled "Consideration." This section states that
"[w]ant of failure of consideration is a defense as against any person not having the
rights of a holder in due course (Section 3-305) . .. ."
58. Leo Syntax Auto Sales, Inc. v. Peoples Bank & Say. Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 226,
35 Ohio Op. 2d 330, 215 N.E.2d 68 (1965).
59. Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 200.
60. Id.
61. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 957
(College ed. 1964).
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checks and that banks should not arbitrate disputes over the payment
of cashier's checks. Both would occur if banks could refuse to pay the
endorsee/holder of a cashier's check based upon another's defenses re-
gardless of whether that third party was both the purchaser and the
payee. Thus, it would seem what followed the "moreover" were addi-
tional reasons why the Ohio case should not have been followed even if
it had not been factually distinguishable.
Such an interpretation would help eliminate some -doubts which
sellers of land may have about accepting an endorsed cashier's check as
payment, and this author would certainly endorse such an interpreta-
tion. Unfortunately, it is merely dicta and unclear dicta at that.6 2
While judicial conservatives will fault the court for going beyond the
facts of this case, many members of the practicing bar will lament that
the court did not go far enough. The rights of an endorsee/holder of a
cashier's check which was purchased by the named payee/endorser
have yet to be made clear and certain.
The uncertainty results, in part, from the existence of another pos-
sible interpretation of this case; the court may have been exercising
judicial restraint and, therefore, the reasons after the "moreover" were
simply a reiteration of the reasons, already expressed, for the holding.
Why, one may ask, did the court go to the trouble of factually .distin-
guishing that case if it intended to indicate that the reasoning of the
Ohio court was erroneous? Why make a big deal out of the distinguish-
ing facts if those facts were not significant enough to have produced a
different outcome? But if the court did not disapprove of the Ohio case,
it might be followed in the future in a case that is not factually distin-
guishable. That should concern real estate lawyers because the distin-
guishable facts in the Ohio case, which involved a purchaser/payee, 3
are exactly what would be encountered in a typical real estate closing.
If the supreme court did not intend to disapprove of the Ohio case,
then why was it even raised?64 The court might have simply been tak-
ing the district court to task for what it considered sloppy workman-
ship65 in hopes of getting a better quality product in the future, but
62. If only a phrase of clarification had been added. For example, "moreover,
even if not distinguishable, this case is not persuasive because . or "moreover, reit-
erating the reasons for-our decision ...."
63. The purchaser of the cashier's check is also the purchaser of the real estate.
64. Of course, that is an excellent argument for the proponents of the first inter-
pretation, i.e., that the court intended to express its disapproval of its reasoning.
65. The impression the court is complaining of (sloppy workmanship) may be
based upon the court's language that "[t]he district court's reliance [on the Ohio case]
1238 . [Vol. 15
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that hardly seems warranted by this district court decision. Rather, the
court might have been leaving open the possibility that it might, at
some time in the future, allow a bank to escape liability for wrongful
dishonor, where a real estate buyer purchased a cashier's check, used it
at closing to pay the purchase price by endorsing it over to the seller,
and subsequently convinced the issuing bank not to honor it based upon
a claim that the condition of the property had been misrepresented.
That possibility, however remote it may seem, might encourage a dis-
gruntled or unscrupulous buyer to try it, might encourage the bank to
agree,66 " and should concern sellers and their lawyers. Because of the
language in this case, the real estate seller who accepts the endorsed
cashier's check does so with the risk that the buyer might try to have
the cashier's check dishonored and possibly succeed.67 Nor is it entirely
clear, that the seller would be in any better position with a cashier's
check made out directly to him or her.
This author doubts that the Florida Supreme Court, particularly
in light of its recognition of the importance of facilitating commercial
practices, intended to create this uncertainty or intended to discourage
this use of cashier's checks. Under the current state of the law, sellers
might be well advised to negotiate for a contract term which requires
that the deed be held in escrow until the buyer's check has cleared. A
land seller who accepts an endorsed cashier's check at closing should
realize the risk, but if the contract merely provides for payment by
cashier's check, he or she may have little choice but to take it and hold
his or her breath until the check clears.
It may be advisable to do everything possible to minimize that
time between accepting the check and its being paid by the issuing
bank. The seller might bargain for a term in the contract which re-
quires the cashier's check to be drawn on a local bank. The land seller/
endorsee could immediately present the cashier's check at that bank for
is untenable." Warren Finance, 552 So. 2d at 200. Untenable seems an extreme word if
the court was merely substituting its judgment for that of the lower court.
66. It is far beyond the scope of this article to suggest whether the lawyer for an
issuing bank should consider dishonoring a cashier's check or whether it might incur
liability by doing so. The point here is that a bank might actually do it and that could
cause considerable harm to a real estate seller even if the bank is subsequently held
liable or, as is more likely, the matter is subsequently settled.
67. It may certainly be argued that there is no legitimate reason to mention the
Ohio case other than to leave the door open for a subsequent case to follow it without
being inconsistent with this decision.
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payment.6 8 Even if deposited at another bank, a local check would clear
more quickly than an out-of-state check, and, therefore, be more likely
to clear before there was time for the buyer to make a protest to the
issuing bank. At the very least, the real estate seller should try to
schedule the closing so as to minimize the time between the closing and
the time when the check would normally be expected to clear.6 9
Justice Shaw concurred specially in Warren, noting that he would
have preferred to adopt the cash equivalent theory, and he would have
preferred that the court go no further than was necessary to decide this
case. Since the bank in this case did not assert any real or personal
defenses, it was, he stated, inappropriate to speculate upon the question
of whether they could be asserted against the presentment of an en-
dorsed cashier's check.70
The uncertainty in the use of cashier's checks is a problem which
could be quickly and easily solved by the legislature. It has not, thus
far, been hesitant to modify the terms of the U.C.C., and, solving this
problem would not require elaborate statutory surgery. Until that hap-
pens, or the supreme court has the opportunity to clarify this holding,
the current practice of a seller accepting an endorsed cashier's check is
under an unfortunate, and probably inadvertent, cloud.
III. RECORDING
A. Title Search
Erskine Florida Properties, Inc. v. First American Title Insurance,
Inc.71
The court state the issue in this case as: "WHEN A PARTY
CONDUCTS A TITLE SEARCH OF A PIECE OF PROPERTY
AND SEARCHES ONLY THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT AL-
PHABETICAL INDEXES, CAN IT BE HELD LIABLE FOR
FAILING TO DISCOVER AN IMPROPERLY INDEXED
68. Perhaps the land seller might present it to the issuing bank and obtain, in
exchange, a cashier's check in which he is the named payee and the purchaser. Asking
for cash will probably result in a ridiculous delay, possibly refusal for lack of sufficient
cash, and the unpleasant attention of both the D.E.A. and the I.R.S.
69. For example, the closing should be scheduled so there is no weekend between
the closing and the anticipated payment of the check by the issuing bank.
70. 552 So. 2d at 201 (Shaw, J., concurring specially).
71. 557 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1989). Justice Shaw wrote the opinion for an unani-
mous court.
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CLAIM?" 72 The question could probably be better stated by asking if
an abstractor could be held liable for failing to discover an outstanding
interest which was not properly indexed in the official grantor-grantee
indexes but was discoverable in another index. Both questions are an-
swered by the word "yes."
Erskine contracted for First American to provide a title search.
First American searched only the "alphabetical indexes maintained in
the county clerk's office,"'73 but failed to discover a third party's supe-
rior interest because evidence of that had not been properly indexed. 4
The interest could, however, have been discovered by reference to a
computerized index system which identified the parcels by numbers. 5
The court reasoned that an abstractor has contracted to determine
what is in the public record. 76 Therefore, the abstractor may be held
liable for breaching that contract 77 if the search is not conducted "skill-
fully and diligently. 78 The problem in this case is that the plaintiff had
not introduced any expert evidence that the search failed to meet this
standard.79 The evidence did show, however, that an index organized
by parcel numbers existed which the abstractor admitted was relied
upon "as a security check," although "her office caution[ed] abstract-
ers not to rely solely on [it] . . , ."80 The supreme court found that
this was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that
the abstractor had failed to perform its contractual duty.a"
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. A more complete explanation of the facts may be discovered in the district
court's opinion, but it is not necessary for the discussion here. See First Am. Title Ins.
Co. v. Erskine Florida Properties, Inc., 528 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
75. The abstractor testified that parcels of land are assigned an identification
number and that number is used when the information is entered into the computer.
Erskine, 557 So. 2d at 860.
76. Id. (quoting with approval Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 20, 215 N.W.2d
149, 157 (1974)).
77. See, e.g., First Am. Title Insurance Co. v. First Title Serv. Co., 457 So. 2d
467 (Fla. 1984); Stickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So.
195 (1940). Note that this impliedly, though not expressly, overrules the holding in
Kovaleski v. Tallahassee Title Co., 363 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
78. Erskine, 557 So. 2d at 860 (quoting First Am. Title Insurance Co., 457 So.
2d at 472).
79. This was the point on which the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff had
been reversed by the district court. See First Am. Title Insurance Co. v. Erskine Flor-
ida Properties, Inc., 528 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
80. Erskine, 557 So. 2d at 860.
81. Id. More informative is the dissent of Judge Letts in the district court's opin-
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The court may seem to be adopting a rule that an abstractor must
examine any secondary indexes whi "h are available, but the court did
not necessarily go so far. It only found that the evidence here was suffi-
cient to uphold the trial court's decision. Thus, the holding is merely
that an abstractor can be found liable, without the introduction of ex-
pert testimony on the level of care and skill required, for failing to find
a misindexed encumbrance which could not have been found in public
records but could have been found in a secondary index."' The court
pointed out that "First American was free to introduce its own experts
to show that it conducted a skillful and diligent search." 3 The outcome
of this case might have been different if the abstractor had introduced
expert evidence to show that the standard in that county did not re-
quire searching both indexes.
Furthermore, confusion is created by the fact that the court never
stated whether the second index involved was an official index or a pri-
vately owned index. 4 Nor is there anything in the district court's opin-
ion to clarify that point. It seems possible that the parcel identification
index here was an official index,85 but even so, this case may be opening
the door to a future holding that an abstractor cannot rely solely upon
the official index if a highly regarded private index exists. Abstractors
and title searchers should be concerned.
B. Lis Pendens
American Legion Community Club v. Diamond 6
Under the doctrine of lis pendens, once litigation has commenced
ion. Judge Letts, an admitted "former abstract-thumber," pointed out that "[in the
instant case, the trial court held 'from its own experience' that a 'title searcher reviews
the records via legal description' and, in effect, took judicial notice of that fact. I see no
room for an argument about such a basic tenet of abstracting." Erskine, 528 So. 2d at
1231 (Letts, J., dissenting).
82. Erskine, 557 So. 2d at 860.
83. Id.
84. For example, an index based upon a privately owned title plant.
85. The case notes that the parcel identification index was organized by numbers
assigned by the tax assessor's office. Further, the quote used by the court regarding the
abstractor's contractual obligation was that "an abstracter is hired to determine what is
in the public record. . . ." Id. (quoting Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 20, 215.
N.W.2d 149, 157 (1974)).
86. 561 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1990). Justice Overton wrote the opinion for an unani-
mous court.
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regarding title to land, any subsequent purchaser is bound by the out-
come of that litigation. By statute, Florida has modified that doctrine
by requiring the recording of a notice of lis pendens 7 in the office of
the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the property is lo-
cated. Under the statute, the filing of the notice acts as a bar to all
subsequent claims and also to any prior unrecorded claims unless the
claimant intervenes in the proceedings within twenty days."8 The notice
is only effective for one year "unless the relief sought is disclosed by
the initial pleading to be founded on a duly recorded instrument
. . ," The district courts had produced inconsistent interpretations
of that phrase.90 In Diamond, the Florida Supreme Court eliminated
the conflict by providing the authoritative interpretation.
In the first suit, the American Legion Community Club (hereinaf-
ter "Club") had sued-to cancel a lease to Murray Diamond. 91 Diamond
counterclaimed and also filed a third party complaint against Del Rossi
Enterprises, Inc.92 The trial court held that the lease was valid and
awarded Diamond damages on its third party complaint. 93 On the day
of the trial court's decision, the Club conveyed the land to Del Rossi.
Three years later, on November 19, 1987, Diamond sought the forced
sale of the property to satisfy his judgment against Del Rossi. Unfortu-
nately, in the interim, the property had already been the subject of a
settlement agreement in another suit.
In the second suit, the American Legion Department of Florida
(hereinafter "Department") had filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the
87. FLA. STAT. § 48.23 (1985). Although the statute has not been modified since
its 1985 enactment, this discussion will refer to the 1985 codification which was the
topic of this case.
88. Id. at § 48.23(l)(b).
89. Id. at § 48.23(2).
90. See Diamond v. American Legion Community Club, 544 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (the case which the Florida Supreme Court was reviewing); Al-
bega Corp. v. Manning, 468 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Berkley Multi-
Units, Inc. v. Linder, 464 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mohican Valley,
Inc. v. MacDonald, 443 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Chapman v. L & N
Grovel, Inc., 244 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
91. The basis for this suit was the claim that the corporate officers who made the
lease lacked the necessary authority.
92. The basis for the third party complaint was that Del Rossi had "intentionally
and maliciously interfered with the lease agreement between American Legion Com-
munity Club and Diamond." 561 So. 2d at 270.
93. That decision was affirmed. See American Legion Community Club v. Dia-
mond, 461 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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deed to Del Rossi should be declared void. It filed a notice of lis
pendens on June 27, 1985. In a settlement agreement, entered as a
judgment on December 29, 1987, Del Rossi agreed to reconvey the
property to the Department.
If the notice of lis pendens filed in the second suit was still effec-
tive when Diamond sought to execute its judgment from the first suit,
then Diamond's execution sale would fail because the sale would be
subject to the outcome of the first suit, i.e., the agreed reconveyance to
the Department, and Diamond had no basis for executing against the
Department's property.94 In other words, .Diamond would not be able to
force the sale of the property which belonged to the Department to
satisfy his judgment against the Club. However, if the Department's
notice of lis pendens had expired when Diamond sought the execution
sale, that sale would take priority over the agreement to reconvey to
the Department. 5 The sale was more than one year after the filing of
the lis pendens in the second suit, so the notice would no longer be
effective unless "the relief sought [was] disclosed by the initial pleading
to be founded on a duly recorded instrument .. "96
The second suit was based upon the claim that the deed was void
because it was "neither considered nor approved by the requisite num-
ber of members of the Executive Committee, Board of Directors, and
Board of Trustees .. .and there was a total absence of considera-
tion."'97 The court noted that these were circumstances surrounding the
execution of the deed. In pointing out the conflict among the districts,
the court quoted from a Fourth District 8 decision to the effect that the
crucial point should be whether notice of potential litigation was af-
forded by the recorded instrument itself. It contrasted a recorded mort-
gage, which by its nature gives notice to all that there is the potential
for foreclosure, with the recording of a warranty deed, as occurred
here, which does not give any warning that an action may occur to test
its validity. While the court never expressly approved the Fourth Dis-
trict's decision, it did state that it was "better reasoned" 99 than the
other decisions. The court concluded that a notice of lis pendens is
94. Diamond, 561 So. 2d at 271.
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 48.23(2) (1985).
97. Diamond, 561 So. 2d at 270.
98. Id. at 271-72; see Berkley Multi-Units, Inc. v. Linder, 464 So. 2d 1356,
1357-58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
99. Diamond, 561 So. 2d at 272.
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founded upon a recorded instrument only when the claim is based upon
the terms and provisions contained in the document.100 To do other-
wise, it stated, would practically eliminate the one year limitation.' 0'
The court further dismissed any claim that Diamond was bound
by the outcome of the second suit because he had constructive notice of
it.102 The court relied upon the plain language of the statute that "[n]o
notice of lis pendens is effectual for any purpose beyond one year
.. .., without further explanation, noting that the Department
could have requested that the trial court extend the period of effective-
ness of the notice. 04 The implication is that any claim to extend the
effectiveness of the recorded notice had been waived.
IV. WILLS - MORTMAIN
Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic °5
Florida Statute section 732.803 (1985) was a mortmain statute. It
provided that the spouse or lineal descendant could avoid a devise made
to a "benevolent, charitable, educational, literary, scientific, religious,
or missionary institution, corporation, association, or purpose . . . or a
county, city or town . . ." if made within the six months preceeding
the testator's death.106 When her mother left the substantial residue of
100. Id. at 271.
101. Id. at 272.
102. Why he had "constructive notice" of it is not suggested. Probably, the claim
was that the expired notice of lis pendens should have been discovered in the title
search and, consequently, its existence in the record should have put the world on con-
structive notice even though it had expired.
103. Id. at 272 (emphasis supplied by the court).
104. Id. The court can grant an extension on reasonable notice, for good cause
and subject to such terms as the court concludes that justice requires. FLA. STAT. §
48.23(1)(b) (1985).
105. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990). Justice Barkett wrote the opinion for the court,
joined by Chief Justice Ehrlich and Justices Shaw and Kogan. Justice Grimes wrote an
opinion concurring with the result. Justice McDonald wrote an opinion, joined by Jus-
tice Overton, concurring with the result and dissenting in part.
106. FLA. STAT. § 732.803 (1985). Actually there may be some academic argu-
ment about whether the statute was really a mortmain statute, but that is of no great
importance. Justice McDonald did state in Zrillic: "Our statute is not a mortmain act.
The Legislature never intended by the enactment of the statute to place any restriction
upon the right of benevolent, charitable, educational, or religious institutions to take
and hold property . . . ." Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 72 (McDonald, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 364, 17 So. 2d 615,
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her estate to the Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children, Lorraine E.
Zrillic invoked the statute. The circuit court held that she had standing
to invoke the statute, but that the statute was unconstitutional.', 7 On
the latter point, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed. 10 8
Before it could reach the constitutional issue, the supreme court
had to deal with the standing issue. It had been argued that the daugh-
ter, Lorraine Zrillic, did not have standing to invoke the statute be-
cause she has been expressly disinherited, except for the specific be-
quest of certain antique dishes and figurines. The statute provided that
the devise could be avoided by a spouse or lineal descendant "who
would receive any interest in the devise, if avoided ... ."1011 There was
no doubt that the daughter was testator's lineal descendant, but it was
argued that the testator's clearly expressed intent was that her daugh-
ter receive only that specific property. To give her part of the residue
would violate the testator's intent, and the general rule of will interpre-
tation is that the intent of the testator controls."10
The court rejected the argument. It held that the statute was a
specific statute which would, following the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion, supersede general rules like the rules of will construction."' Fur-
ther, the plain meaning of the statute did not deny standing to any
lineal descendant simply because that descendant would otherwise be
limited to a specific devise. More importantly, the purpose of the stat-
ute would be undermined if the only ones to have standing would be
those that the testator intended to receive the devise because the point
of the statute is to deprive an intended beneficiary of the property
which the testator expressly intended it to have." 12
The court, however, found that the statute was unconstitutional on
618, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666 (1944)).
107. Id. at 66.
108. Zrillic v. Estate of Romans, 535 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
had held the statute constitutional. Consequently, the daughter could invoke it to avoid
the residuary devise to the hospital and the residue would then pass to her by intestate
succession. Plaintiff, the testator's daughter, would be entitled to an intestate share.
109. FLA. STAT. § 732.803(c) (1985).
110. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 66. There is no mention of an alternate residuary
legatee, so Lorraine E. Zrillic would apparently inherit all or part of the residue under
the laws of intestate succession.
111. Id.
112. Possibly the Shriner's argument was that the statute could only be invoked
by a lineal descendant who was a residuary legatee, but even that makes little sense.
Moreover, the point seems moot since the statute was held unconstitutional.
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two grounds. 113 First, it violated article I, section 2 of the Florida Con-
stitution. Second, it violated the equal protection clause of both the
Florida Constitution" 4 and the United States Constitution"'.
The Florida Constitution provides that all natural persons have the
right to "acquire, possess and protect property" subject only to the ex-
ception that "ownership, inheritance, dispossession and possession of
real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or
prohibited by law.""' 6 The court relied upon "a common sense reading
of the plain and ordinary meaning of the language to carry out the
intent of the framers as applied to the context of our times." 117 The
court concluded that the historical treatment of devise as a statutory
right, rather than a common law property right, is an anachronism to
be discarded, and as a property right, it would be protected by this
provision." 8
Since the right to devise property is protected by the constitution,
a statute which interfered with that right would be constitutional only
if it was "reasonably necessary."'"19 The court concluded that this stat-
ute was not. 20 The historical justification of mortmain statutes was "to
restrict the church's ability to acquire property" and there is no compa-
rable need today.' 21 Nor did the statute protect the testator's dependent
or needy family from disinheritance. Family members were already ad-
equately protected by other Florida laws,' 22 so this statute merely pro-
vided windfalls to some relatives, contrary to the wishes of the testator.
It is important to note that the "reasonably necessary" standard may
now be used as the test of any statute, i.e., probate statutes, which in
any way may interfere with this newly recognized constitutional right
113. Id. at 68-69.
114. FLA. CONsT. art 1, § 2.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
116. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
117. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 67.
118. Id. at 68-69.
119. Id. at 68.
120. Id. at 69.
121. Id. at 68.
122. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (homestead exemptions for real and per-
sonal property); FLA. STAT. §§ 732.401-.4015 (1985); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5 (a cover-
ture restriction); FLA. STAT. § 731.111 (1985); FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201-.215 (1985) (an
elective share as provided by the Uniform Probate Code); FLA. STAT. § 732.402 (1985)
(personal property exemptions); FLA. STAT. § 732.403 (1985) (family allowance); FLA.
STAT. § 732.5165 (1985) (protection against fraud, duress, mistake, and undue
influence).
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to devise property.
The court also found that the statute violated the equal protection
guarantees of the Florida and United States Constitutions by creating
a class of testators whose final wishes would be ignored without ra-
tional justification. 23 The court found the statute to be both underin-
clusive and overinclusive. 124 It was underinclusive in that it did not pro-
tect against the evils of gifts being made without proper deliberation or
as a result of undue influence if the testator happened to live more than
six months after the will was executed. Furthermore, it only protected
against the possible overreaching by a narrow group of beneficiaries,
while failing to protect against the dangers posed by "unscrupulous and
greedy relatives, friends, or acquaintances."'1 25 Conversely, it was over-
inclusive because it would allow avoidance of a charitable devise or be-
quest even though none of the evils feared had occurred simply because
the testator died within six months after the will was executed. Conse-
quently, the use of the six month dividing line was irrational and the
statute was unconstitutional.
Justice Grimes concurred with the result. He expressed agreement
with the court's conclusion that the statute violated the equal protec-
tion clauses of both constitutions, but disagreed with the court's conclu-
sion that the right to leave property in a will was a constitutional right
under the Florida Constitution. He emphasized that the mortmain stat-
ute had been upheld in 1944 despite similar language in the version of
the Florida Constitution then in effect 1 6 and "[n]othing has occurred
since that date to suggest that this analysis was wrong."' 2 7 The major-
ity, however, had pointed to that very case as an example of "unques-
tioned allegiance to an antiquated way of thinking," i.e., that case was
overruled, not because of subsequent events, but due to the precedent's
failure to properly analyze the matter.2 8
Justice McDonald concurred with the result, but dissented in part.
123. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 70. The court acknowledged that recognition as a
property right of the testator's right to leave property in a will may possibly indicate
that a heightened level of scrutiny would be appropriate, but it did not address that
issue because it concluded that this statute would not even survive the minimal scrutiny
of the rational basis test. Id. at 70 n.6.
124. Id. at 70.
125. Id.
126. See Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323
U.S. 666 (1944).
127. 563 So. 2d at 71.
128. Id. at 68.
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He would have upheld the constitutionality of the statute because the
right to leave property in a will has continuously been held to be
merely a statutory right in Florida and because it is a rational way to
protect testators' families from the danger that a testator will exercise
poor judgment in the face of impending death.'29 However, he would
never have reached that issue. He had concluded that the plaintiff in
this case did not have standing to invoke the statute because "[u]nder
these circumstances other lineal descendants would be the residual leg-
atees who would receive any voided bequests, not Mrs. Zrillic.' °3 0
This statement leaves the reader with some confusion over the
facts of the case which, unfortunately, cannot be not cleared up by
reading the district court's opinion. Were there, as Justice McDonald
suggests, other legatees named in the will who would divide the residue
including the hospital's interest if its devise was eliminated by the stat-
ute? If so, then it makes little sense to hold that Mrs. Zrillic had stand-
ing because she would not have benefitted by invoking the statute, and
the only possible reason for her invoking it would have been to spite the
intended beneficiary, the hospital.
If, as may have been the case, there was no other residuary lega-
tee, the residue property would have been divided between those enti-
tled to an intestate share. As the deceased's daughter, Mrs. Zrillic
should have taken the property, or at least a share in it, and so she
should have standing to invoke the statute because it would have pro-
duced a benefit for her, unless the statute provided otherwise. Unfortu-
nately, the statute was less than clear on this point and this opinion
does not eliminate the confusion about the standing issue.
The statute provided that the devise could be avoided by a spouse
or lineal descendant "who would receive any interest in the devise
.. .. Was Mrs. Zrillic given standing because invoking the statute
would result in her taking more of her mother's estate, or did she have
standing because she had received a specific devise under the will, even
though that interest would not be enlarged by invoking the statute?
This author would be shocked to learn that it was the latter, but it is
certainly possible to interpret this decision as indicating that.
The focus on standing under the statute may seem pointless since
the statute was held unconstitutional. However, it is worth considering
because the legislature might attempt to enact a replacement statute.
129. Id. at 71.
130. Id.
131. FLA. STAT. § 732.803(c) (1985) (emphasis added).
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Hopefully, the legislature would avoid creating a statute with similar
shortcomings. Moreover, this case may be applied by analogy to other
statutes and any precedent which creates confusion about standing may
cause unforseen problems in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
The year has not produced any particularly noteworthy develop-
ments in real estate law from the Florida Supreme Court or, for that
matter, from the legislature 32 or elsewhere.133 These decisions do not
132. Some may disagree and the author acknowledges that the legislature did
significantly amend Florida Statute chapter 713, Part I, the mechanics' lien laws, even
transforming "mechanics' liens" into "construction liens." 1990 Fla. Laws 109. In ad-
dition, it did: create section 695.26, Florida Statutes, which provides that no instrument
affecting title to real property executed after July 1, 1991 may be recorded unless
certain formal requirements are satisfied (e.g., names must be typed, printed or
stamped legibly beneath each signature and a one and one half inch square at the top
right hand corner must be left empty for the clerk's use), 1990 Fla. Laws 183; enact a
statute providing immunity from civil suit by a trespasser under the influence of drugs
or alcohol, 1990 Fla. Laws 140; enact the Mortgage Lending Act which requires the
licensing of certain mortgage lenders, 1990 Fla. Laws 353; enact 1990 Fla. Laws 149
regarding mortgage insurance; amend Florida Statute ch. 723, the Florida Mobile
Home Act, 1990 Fla. Laws 198; repeal section 421.102, Florida Statutes, which pro-
vided that a tenant of public housing could be evicted for certain drug offenses, but
only the guilty person could be evicted and not the other members of the household,
1990 Fla. Laws 137; and amend the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act by requiring
smoke detectors in single-famil and duplex homes and by allowing the landlord and
tenant to enter a separate agreement absolving the landlord of liability or responsibility
for storage of tenant's personal property after surrender or abandonment by the tenant,
1990 Fla. Laws 133.
133. There are, of course, a plethora of cases and some are interesting. See
Gerber v. Longboat Harbor North Condo., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D. Fla. 1989)
(concerning the constitutionality of a condominium's rule prohibiting a member from
flying the United States flag); Fish v. Post of Amvets #85, 560 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (regarding sufficiency of a complaint in a quiet title suit); Whitice
Bonding Agency, Inc. v. Levitz, 559 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (regard-
ing the priority of a corrective mortgage); Hopkins-Easton & Assoc., Inc. v. Santana
Properties, Inc., 557 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (clarifying the broker's
right to both part of the forfeited deposit of a defaulting buyer and a commission on
the subsequent sale to another buyer); Hall v. City of Orlando, 555 So. 2d 963 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (regarding the appropriateness of granting an injunction
against over-use of a drainage easement); Pelican Island Property Owners Assoc., Inc.
v. Murphy, 554 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (regarding waiver or estop-
pel and the violation of deed restrictions by the building of a carport without the asso-
ciation's approval).
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break any new ground or depart from established trends. Some of these
opinions should be viewed with caution because of the uncertainties
which they create.
Like last year,' no discernable voting or decision patterns have
emerged. Of the six opinions, Justice Overton wrote two and Justices
Barkett, Ehrlich, McDonald and Shaw each wrote one. Justice Grimes,
who wrote more real property decisions last year than any other Jus-
tice, did not write any this year, but he did write a concurrence. Only
Justice Kogan seems to be uninvolved in real property,13 5 but that may
simply be a product of the small sampling available.136
134. See Brown, The 1989 Survey of Florida Law, Real Property, 14 NOVA
L.REv. 939 (1990).
135. Justice Kogan did not write any opinion, simply joining with the majority
opinion in each of the cases.
136. Last year Justice Kogan wrote the opinion in Gibson v. Courtois, 539 So.
2d 459 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a buyer could not recover attorney's fees provided for
by a contract which the buyer had successfully argued had never come into existence
because the offer had never been accepted before it was revoked).
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